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RECENT BOOKS
SHALL WE AMEND THE FIITH AMENDMENT? By Lewis Mayers. New
York: Harper and Brothers. 1959. Pp. x, 351. $5.
Most of the provisions of our federal and state constitutions have a rather
clearly-defined history. Naturally their application has been extended to
situations which the drafters never envisioned, but there is nevertheless
continuity which can be traced, and enforcement of policies not completely inconsistent with the resolution of problems of policy choice which
existed at the time the provisions came originally into effect. Some provisions, like the due process clauses, had no precise meaning at their inception, and thus have allowed maximum flexibility of decision to the courts,
but even in this instance there is usually a gradual evolution of legal doctrine
which is capable of historical and legal analysis and explanation. But such
a process of analysis and explanation is extremely difficult in the case of
the privilege against self-incrimination, the actual subject matter of Professor
Mayers' book, Shall We Amend the Fifth Amendment? The privilege is
often stated to be one of the traditional bulwarks against arbitrary government invasion of individual liberty,1 and it is commonplace to cite the
excesses of the Court of High Commission, particularly in connection with
actions brought against John Lilburne, 2 but the fact is that there is little in
the way of historical evidence by which we may trace our common American
constitutional language to these historical events.3 There is no clear indication of what the drafters had in mind at the time of the adoption of the
fifth amendment, but from the context in which the self-incrimination
provision is found it is rather evident that it was aimed at protecting the
defendant in a criminal case against being the source of testimonial evidence
against himself. There seems to have been no purpose to create as a constitutional device or to raise to the level of constitutional doctrine an
evidentiary witness privilege which arguably may have existed at least in
rudimentary form at the time.4 Indeed, the author suggests that at most
the provision was intended to guard against the possible resurgence of purely
administrative abuses which some of the earlier royal governors had committed in investigating what was from the point of view of the royal government treasonous or otherwise undesirable conduct.5 If so, there seems to be
no substantial continuity between the present highly technical and extremely
1 Chapter 11 of the principal work brings together a number of leading examples of
such statements.
2 3 HowELL, STATE TRIALS 1316 (1816) (seditious libel-1637); 4 id. 1269 (high
treason -1649). Their significance is summarized in the principal work at page 14 and
notes. See also GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH Al\lEND:IIENT TODAY 3 (1955).
8 This forms the theme of the author's discussion in chapter 12, "The Irrelevance of
Hi!tory."
4 See the principal work at pages 197-215 and 233-241 for the development of the
witness privilege in federal practice.
IS Page 219.
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beneficent (to the possible criminal or the exceptionally shy) body of law
subsumed under the term "privilege against self-incrimination," and what
was probably considered at the time of the adoption of the amendment as a
safeguard against administrative abuses which might possibly be revived at
a future time.
Even if one rejects as unimportant the question of historical explanation
and justification of the doctrine, and considers the problem to be one of
balancing standards of personal liberty against the legitimate needs of
modem society, it is difficult to make sense out of the present law of selfincrimination. The amendment refers to criminal cases, but it has probably
its broadest application in proceedings other than criminal trials. 6 It is
stated to rest on the idea that no person should provide the (first) accusation
against himself, but in fact it is invoked to prevent a witness having to give
the slightest testimony which might have the least possibility of helping the
prosecutor along in some for the present hypothetical prosecution.7 At
times it is stated to be designed to prevent torture, 8 yet it is not applied to
confessions obtained through police interrogation or, in most jurisdictions,
to evidence obtained by means of other methods of police investigation.0
It is proclaimed as a bulwark of individual liberty, but its partisans ignore
its practical impact in preventing some defendants from proving their innocence,10 or some injured plaintiffs from establishing what outside the
courtroom would be felt to be a legitimate claim for compensation,11 or
some prosecuting attorneys or grand juries from establishing the identity of
the perpetrators of an offense, the existence of which is beyond cavil,12 or
some legislative committees from determining facts on which needed legislation or legislative changes might rest.1 3 Though it is held up as a doctrine
Chapters 7 and 8.
this setting it was not 'perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the
circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer(s) cannot
possibly have such tendency' to incriminate..•. " Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479,
488 (1951).
s "I would like to venture the suggestion that the privilege against self-incrimination
is one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized. As I have
already pointed out, the establishment of the privilege is closely linked historically with
the abolition of torture. Now we look upon torture with abhorrence. But torture was
once used by honest and conscientious public servants as a means of obtaining information about crimes which could not othenvise be disclosed. We want none of that today,
I am sure. For a very similar reason, we do not make even the most hardened criminal
sign his own death warrant, or dig his own grave, or pull the lever that springs the trap
on which he stands. We have through the course of history developed a considerable feeling
of the dignity and intrinsic importance of the individual man. Even the evil man is a
human being." GRISWOLD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 7.
o Chapter 5. Compare the application of the rule so as to prevent any questioning
by the magistrate at the preliminary hearing, discussed in chapter 4.
10 See pages 30 and 117-121.
11 Page 123. Chapter IO, "The Holder of a Position of Trust," is also worthy of note
as it points out that protection is accorded the person who has violated a public or private
trust to the degree that it often becomes difficult to call him to account.
12 The author at page 68 cites the Emmett Till lynching case as an excellent example.
13 Chapter 8.
6

7 "In
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for the protection of the private citizen about to be caught in the toils of
the law, an almost medieval doctrine of waiver is applied by many courts
which manages to deprive those persons who perhaps need it most of any
effective protection.1 4 The discussion of these vagaries and inconsistencies
forms a large portion of the principal work, and constitutes a welcome addition to a field in which much of the writing rather uncritically accepts the
present state of law governing the privilege as historically sound and of
unimpeachable desirability in today's social and legal situation.
The author's conclusion is that amendment of the federal constitutional
provision is the only way to restore some degree of balance between the
desire of the individual to keep private information which he may have and
the needs of the legal system to have a systematic development of relevant
facts in judicial, administrative and legislative hearings. He advocates
constitutional amendment of the privilege to approximate the present
coverage of Canadian law,15 and cites the example of the New York Constitution to illustrate the fact that state constitutions can be amended successfully in this area.16 But in considering the need for and propriety of
amending the various privilege provisions, the chief thing to keep in mind
is the fact, which the author points out at several places, that the present
body of law covering the privilege (s) against self-incrimination is purely
one of judge-made doctrine, the inception of which for practical purposes is
the case of Counselman v. Hitchcock in 1892,17 and the chief development
of which has been in the hands of many of the present Supreme Court
Justices. So long as the Supreme Court of the United States and at least
some of the state supreme courts are willing to extend to the utmost degree
in favor of private appellants an inherently vague concept of human freedom, dignity or right of privacy, created by them without reference to the
actual language of the constitutional provisions, to constitutional history
H

Pages 49-51.

15" (I) No witness shall be excused from answering any question upon the ground
that the answer to such question may tend to criminate him, or may tend to establish his
liability to a civil proceeding at the instance of the Crown or of any person.
(2) Where with respect to any question a witness objects to answer upon the
ground that his answer may tend to criminate him, or may tend to establish his liability
to a civil proceeding at the instance of the Crown or of any person, and if but for this
Act, or the Act of any provincial legislature, the witness would therefore have been excused
from answering such question, then although the witness is by reason of this Act, or by
reason of such provincial Act, compelled to answer, the answer so given shall not be used
or receivable in evidence against him in any criminal trial, or other criminal proceeding
against him thereafter taking place, other than a prosecution for perjury in the giving
of such evidence." Canada Evidence Act, CAN. REv. STAT. ch. 307, § 5 (1952).
16 In 1938 Article I, § 6, of the NEW Yorut CONSTITUTION was amended to include:
" ••• providing, that any public officer who, upon being called before a grand jury to
testify concerning the conduct of his office or the performance of his official duties, refuses
to sign a waiver of immunity against subsequent criminal prosecution, or to answer any
relevant question concerning such matters before such grand jury, shall by virtue of such
refusal, be disqualified from holding any other public office or public employment for a
period of five years, and shall be removed from office by the appropriate authority or
shall forfeit his office at the suit of the attorney-general."
17 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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and to the existence of troublesome facts inconsistent with, and therefore
apparently irrelevant to, the conditions of orderly law enforcement which
they have stated on numerous occasions to have been achieved by their
judicially-created rules, amendment of a constitutional provision is not
likely to make much difference; the same idea will only appear in a different
form under another constitutional provision.
An example of this may be found in recent decisions of the Michigan
Supreme Court. Some years ago the court took the unorthodox position
that the privilege against self-incrimination prohibited the acquisition of
any evidence from a non-consenting subject and thus prevented the police
from ordering the physical examination of a rape suspect.ls After the lapse
of a number of years the court was asked to strike down a conviction based
in part on evidence consisting of photographs taken shortly after the defendant had been arrested for rape, showing scratches on his body.10 It
refused to consider the point on the ground that the matter had not been
properly raised, but indicated in passing that the concept of privilege was
held by most modem writers not to be properly applicable to anything but
testimonial utterances. Finally, in a recent case it held it would confirm
the usual rule to this effect.20 But ·within a short period of time it held, 21
without analysis of the facts or consideration of its earlier decisions defining
the scope of proper search and seizure by police, that the search and seizure
provision of the Michigan Constitution created a general right of privacy
which was unconstitutionally invaded when a hospital employee took a
blood sample from an unconscious defendant and turned it over to a state
trooper, and further and most significant, that the summoning of the officer
as a witness for the plaintiff in a civil action arising out of the defendant's
apparently negligent conduct was error, though not such as to require
reversal in light of the ample evidence in the case.22 Thus Michigan may
have been brought within the usual rules covering the privilege against self•
incrimination, but the Michigan court's hypersensitive concern for the

18 People

v. Corder, 244 Mich. 274, 221 N.W. 309 (1928).

10 People v. Placido, 310 Mich. 404, 17 N.W. 2d 230 (1945).
20 Berney v. Volk, 341 Mich. 647, 67 N.W. 2d 801 (1955).
21 Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W. 2d 281 (1958).
22 The court did not consider it necessary or appropriate to examine the question of
why the officer's conduct was illegal or unconstitutional, or how police conduct might be
regulated in the future by the judicial device of excluding evidence in a civil case brought
to recover compensation for harm done to a blameless citizen through the defendant's
illegal and negligent conduct. For a criticism of other "visceral" decisions in the area
of search and seizure handed down recently by the Michigan Supreme Court, see Waite,
Comment: Search and Seizure - Suppression of Evidence - Judicial Attitude Toward En·
forcement, 58 MICH. L. REv. 1044 (1960).
23 Less changeable, in the sense that MICH. CoNsr. art. II, § 10 (1908) has been twice
amended to carve out exceptions to the exclusionary rule of evidence earlier adopted by
the Michigan Supreme Court. This no doubt supports the court's belief that it is laying
down pure constitutional doctrine in its sweeping extensions of its control over police
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"right of security of (the) person" has merely burgeoned in a different, and
less readily changeable,2s way.
Justice Holmes said that "it is revolting to have no better reason for a
rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."24 But
to the reviewer it is equally revolting that no better reason can be laid
down for a rule than that the court's decision is required by standards of
human dignity, decency, privacy or whatever.25 Too often such statements
are considered as a more than adequate substitute for examination of constitutional precedent and consideration of the actual results which may be
expected to flow from the adoption of each of several available rules, including questions of what benefits or deprivations other groups in society will
experience if a particular group, e.g., witnesses in civil cases or before
legislative committees, is singled out for especially considerate treatment.
Too often, decisions resting on broad constitutional platitudes are capable
of being interpreted as based in fact on the unstated assumption that the
judiciary, rather than the executive or legislative branch, is best able to
determine the direction which government should take and what resolution of conflicting policies is best for the future of the nation, and that
arrest and search activities in the guise of enforcing the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures by excluding evidence obtained by the police.
2-i The
21i The

Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
following quotations illustrate the point:
" ••. And any compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath, or compelling the
production of his private books and papers, to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his
property, is contrary to the principles of a free government. It is abhorrent to the instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may suit
the purposes of despotic power; but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political
liberty and personal freedom." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631 (1886).
"The effective enforcement of a well-designed penal code is of course indispensable for
social security. But the Bill of Rights was added to the original Constitution in the conviction that too high a price may be paid even for the unhampered enforcement of the
criminal law and that, in its attainment, other social objects of a free society should not
be sacrificed. '\Ve are immediately concerned with the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,
intertwined as they are, and expressing as they do supplementing phases of the same
constitutional purpose - to maintain inviolate large areas of personal privacy . . • ."
Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 489 (1944).
"The privilege against self-incrimination is a right that was hard-earned by our forefathers. • • • The privilege, this Court has stated, 'was generally regarded then, as now,
as a privilege of great value, a protection to the innocent though a shelter to the guilty,
and a safeguard against heedless, unfounded or tyrannical prosecutions.' Co-equally with
our other constitutional guarantees, the Self-Incrimination Clause 'must be accorded liberal
construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure.' ..• To apply the privilege
narrowly or begrudgingly- to treat it as an historical relic, at most merely to be tolerated
- is to ignore its development and purpose.'' Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161
(1955).
"I heartily agree that the Fifth Amendment should be preserved, not diluted by
doubtful interpretation - preserved more for the benefit of those of us who would demon•
strate a true belief of democracy and the potent power of our democratic institutions than
of the immediate beneficiaries of its claim ... .'' Clark, C. J., concurring in United States
v. Trock, 232 F.2d 839, 844 (2d Cir. 1956).
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these determinations and resolutions are unassailable if bottomed on
"sacred" constitutional principles.26 Professor Mayers' book provides a
needed and realistic look at what to the reviewer is one of several manifestations of an all too prevalent contemporary judicial attitude which
borders on the arrogant.
B. ]. George, Jr.,
Professor of Law,
University of Michigan
26 " ••• Of course, the courts ought to be cautious to impose a choice of values on the
other branches or a state, based upon the Constitution, only when they are persuaded, on
an adequate and principled analysis, that the choice is clear. That I suggest is all that
self-restraint can mean and in that sense it always is essential, whatever issue may be
posed. The real test inheres, as I have tried to argue, in the force of the analysis .•••"
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HA!tv. L. REv. 1, 25 (1959).

